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OF THE

BATTLEFIELD OF BULL RUN

BATTLES OF

JULY 21, 1861 ^{AND} AUGUST 28, 29 ^{AND} 30, 1862

BY

H. F. HENRY

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Dedication of Monument on Bull Run Battlefield, June 10, 1865.

[Erected by Gen. Gamble, of the Northern Army, in memory of comrades who fell there, July 21st, 1861.]

FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

July 21st, 1861.

FOR a proper understanding of the movements of the contending armies at the First Battle of Bull Run, we shall attempt to present to the reader a brief outline of the lay of the land in that now historic locality, and also, at the same time, something of the appearance of the surrounding country.

Taking our position about one hundred and fifty yards in the rear of the Henry House, on the highest point in this pretty landscape of hill and dale, and facing to the west, we have a commanding view of a lovely little chain of mountains, distant about twelve miles, and fringing the horizon for perhaps a quarter of the circle around us; then turning to the right from the point where the mountains disappear, and following with the eye the line of the horizon, the range of view is bounded by a considerable forest which, at the first point visible, is about five miles distant, but, as we continue our pivotal movement, gradually approaches until, as we finally reach a point with the back squarely turned to our first position, the wooded outline can be seen not more than three miles away. Thus, standing now with our face to the east, we have in a slightly oblique direction to the left and about five miles distant, the village of Centerville, and in a correspondingly oblique direction to the right that of Manassas at about the same distance, both of which were points of the first importance in the memorable contest which we are about to describe. Now continuing our turning movement, we find our view restrained to much narrower



The late H. F. Henry, Sr., and his man Friday.

limits by wooded growths until we have completed the circle and face once more toward the west. Immediately in our front and to a distance of about one hundred and fifty yards extends a plateau, at the westerly side of which is situated the famous Henry House, now surrounded by a pretty grove of shade trees which partly conceal from view from our present position the stone shaft erected in the yard of the dwelling by a detachment of Federal forces under the conduct of Gen. Gamble, immediately after the close of the War, to mark the spot where the bloodiest part of that bloody drama was unfolded. Scarcely do we leave the yard of the Henry House before the ground falls away into a gradual descent for about five hundred yards, and terminates, in a direction obliquely to the right, in the valley of Young's Branch, a tributary of Bull Run, while to the front the descent ends in a depression through which a still smaller stream carries its waters into Young's Branch. In both directions the ground again rises on the other side of the depressions, but to a less altitude. Directly in front of the Henry House, and distant about one hundred and fifty yards, running in a northerly and southerly direction, is a public highway leading from Manassas to Sudley Springs and beyond. To the right and perhaps four hundred yards away is the Warrenton Turnpike, a macadamized highway running in an easterly and westerly direction and connecting the town of Alexandria with the small town of Warrenton, about fifty miles from the first named place. In the valley of Young's Branch, at the foot of the Henry House hill, the two highways form a junction, so that we find the Henry House situated a little distance back from the angle formed by these two roads. Here then was the first "Bloody Angle" of that suicidal conflict, the late Civil War, of which that at Gettysburg was the second. With this descrip-

tion of the topography of the locality it is hoped that the reader will have a tolerably clear understanding of the movements of the two opposing forces in that battle.




Gen. Irwin McDowell.

The principal object of the expedition which finally terminated in the battle of the 21st July, 1861, is explained by Gen. McDowell, commander-in-chief of the Union army, in his official report, as follows:

“And that up to late in the afternoon every movement ordered was carrying us successfully to the object we had proposed before starting—that of getting to the railroad leading from Manassas to the valley of Virginia, and going on it far enough to break up and destroy the communication and interviews between the forces under Beauregard and those under Johnston.”

After the strong demonstration of Gen. McDowell before Blackburn's Ford on the 18th preceding, and his discovery that the enemy was too strongly posted there to make it advisable to attempt to dislodge him, his next plan was to turn him by the right flank, and to this purpose



He put his army in movement about two o'clock on the morning of the 21st July, Sunday. His entire army was divided into five divisions with the following disposition: The Fourth Div., commanded by Gen. Runyon, to remain between Centerville and Alexandria to guard the Capital along the approaches by way of the Va. Midland Ry and Vienna; the Fifth, under Col. Miles, together with one brigade of the First Div., to be charged with the duty of holding the enemy in check on the left, at Blackburn's and contiguous fords

between Centerville and Manassas, to prevent the Union position being turned itself on that side while Gen. McDowell was engaged in turning the hostile army on the right; with the remaining three divisions; the First, less one brigade already detached, commanded by Gen. Tyler, the Second by Col. Hunter and the Third by Col. Heintzelman, the march was commenced, as we have said, about two o'clock in the morning, moving westward along the Warrenton Turnpike towards the Stone Bridge, a structure carrying



Col. later Gen. S. P. Heintzelman.

this highway over Bull Run. The Confederate army was at this time extended along Bull Run from the Union Mills, a ford about two miles from McLean's ford (see chart), to the Stone Bridge, a distance of about seven miles, awaiting in anxious uncertainty the next move of their opponents.

Gen. McDowell's plan was to leave the First Division before the Stone Bridge to engage the attention of the enemy while, with the other two divisions, which he accompanied in person, he should leave the Turnpike by turning to the right, and, under the cover of the forest which has been described in the opening of this narrative, should cross at a ford some three or four miles further up its course, the stream dividing the two armies; then return on the other side to the Stone Bridge, drive the enemy from that point and allow the First Division to cross and form a junction with the other portion of his army; then with his forces thus united, to advance to the Manassas Branch R'y and cut off the connec-

tion of Beauregard with Johnston, as we have already seen was his plan. On that bright Sunday morning in July, therefore, about 6:30 o'clock the echoes were startled by the discharge of a great thirty-pounder rifle Parrott gun, commanded by Lieutenant Haines of Carlisle's Battery. This was the signal agreed upon between Generals Tyler and McDowell to notify the latter that the commander of his first division had arrived in position before the enemy posted on the other side of the Stone Bridge, and it was also the first shot fired in that sanguinary contest. Meanwhile the flanking movement continued through the forest, but the dryness of the roads was such as to cause great clouds of dust to rise as that host pressed on. These were observed by Col. Evans, commanding the demi-brigade entrenched on the other side of the Stone Bridge, and he comprehended at once that the firing then being directed upon his position in front was but a feint, that the real attack was to be in his rear. Leaving, therefore, but four companies and two six-pounder guns to oppose the passage of the Bridge, he marched with the remainder of his command, consisting of six companies of the Fourth So. Carolina Rgt., Wheat's battalion of Louisiana Tigers and two guns, to a position on the plateau to the north of and some thousand yards distant from the Henry House; there disposing his troops to the best advantage the ground permitted, he awaited the appearance of the enemy. About ten o'clock the head of Col. Burnside's brigade of Hunter's division, with the 2nd Rhode Island Rgt. leading, appeared over the slightly rising ground in front and deployed in line. The firing had scarcely more than commenced when Col. Hunter, commanding the division, and Col. Slocum and Maj. Ballou, of the 2nd R. I. Rgt., were all wounded, the two latter mortally. Shortly afterwards the Confederates were

reinforced by four regiments with Gen. Bee in command. Gen. Beauregard, in his official report on the battle thus refers to this incident :

“The heroic Bee, with a soldier’s eye and recognition of the situation, had previously disposed his command with skill—Imboden’s battery having been admirably placed between the two brigades, under shelter, behind the undulations of a hill about 150 yards north of the now famous Henry House, and very near where he (Bee) subsequently fell, mortally wounded, to the great misfortune of his country, but after deeds of deliberate and ever memorable courage.”

Gen. Imboden, who commanded in that battle the artillery attached to Gen. Bee’s command, writes in the *Century Magazine* of May, 1885, as follows :

“Halting my men, I rode to the top of the hill, and had a full view of a long column of glittering bayonets moving up on the north side of the creek (Young’s Branch). Glancing down the valley, I saw Bee’s brigade advancing, and galloped to meet him and report what I had seen. He divined the plans of McDowell, and asking me to accompany him, rode rapidly past the Lewis house, across the hollow beyond it, and up the next hill through the pines, emerging on the summit immediately east of the Henry house, where the beautiful open landscape in front burst upon his vision. He exclaimed with enthusiasm: ‘Here is the battlefield, and we are in for it! Bring up your guns as quickly as possible, and I will look around for a good position.’”

As Beauregard says in an article contributed to the magazine above referred to in its number for November, 1884 :

“Gen. Bee, generously yielding his own better judgment to Evans’ persistence, led the two brigades across the valley under the fire of

“the enemy’s artillery, and threw them into action.”

Meanwhile the Union forces continued to appear in constantly increasing numbers in front and on the right flank. The struggle grew fiercer. On the Southern side Maj. Wheat, commanding the Tigers, Col. Sloane, of the 4th So. Carolina Rgt., Col. Gardner, of the 8th Ga. Rgt., and Col. Jones, of the 4th Ala., were all supposed to be mortally wounded; the first named officer, however, recovered. It was at this juncture that Col., afterwards Gen. W. T. Sherman, commanding the Third Brigade of Tyler’s division, posted before the Stone Bridge, had, in obedience to orders from the commander-in-chief, effected the passage of Bull Run a short distance above the Bridge. The ford was at first unknown to the Northern army, but during the morning a solitary horseman, said to have been the Maj. Wheat just referred to above, was observed to cross the stream at that point to reconnoitre the position of the enemy. Col. Sherman followed the indication thus offered, and found that the troops posted there to guard it, had been withdrawn to take part evidently in the battle raging in the rear, and he was able in consequence to pass his command over without opposition. The brigade was then pushed rapidly forward in the direction from which the firing was heard, and took up its first position at the Pittsylvania house (see chart). It was the presence of this force in their rear which obliged the Confederates to retire from the ground which they had maintained up to this time so stubbornly. Their first retrograde movement was made slowly and in comparatively good order, but as the enemy rushed forward with the impetus which victory creates, the retreat degenerated into a disordered rout. They took the direction to the left oblique, around the base of the Henry House plateau, and were finally brought to a stand on its easterly slope, where,

under the cover and protection of Stonewall Jackson's brigade, their officers succeeded in restoring some degree of order in their ranks. It was on the slight eminence to the east of the Henry House and commanding the plateau in front looking toward the west, where the reader was invited to take his stand at the opening of the present narrative, that Jackson had disposed the five regiments composing his brigade, and was calmly awaiting the approach of the victorious columns as they dashed across the valley of Young's Branch and up the slope leading to the fields surrounding the Henry House. It was while Gen. Bee was thus endeavoring to rally his decimated and disheartened brigades that he directed their attention to Jackson's command, saying: "Look at Jackson's men, they stand like a stonewall." This incident, as we know, has forever attached to the name of their commander the sobriquet of "Stonewall."

At this time the report spread through the army of the North, and was caught up and carried along by the crowds of curiosity seekers, etc. which had followed the army from Washington and were grouped along the Warrenton turnpike from Centerville in the direction of the Capital, that the Confederates were in full retreat and that the day was won. This momentary success, however, proved to be but the opening skirmish of the battle which was to follow. Jackson's brigade, as we have seen, had already reached and taken position on the Henry House hill, and this was followed by other commands as quickly as they could be hastened forward from the positions occupied by them along Bull Run, between the Stone Bridge and Manassas. In the advance of the Northern forces against the position occupied by the Confederates on the Henry House hill, the following are in general the relative positions occupied by their various commands. The passage of Bull Run by Sher-

man's brigade was immediately followed by that of Col. Keyes, commanding the First Brigade of the



Col. later Gen. E. D. Keyes.

First Division. This body of troops took its line of march to the left front, along the ridge commanding the stream of Bull Run, and, therefore, occupied the extreme left of the Union position. At a considerable distance further to the right and occupying the center of the attacking forces, was Franklin's brigade of Heintzelman's division, together with portions of the command of Col. Andrew Porter, commanding the First Brigade of the 2nd Division; while Sherman's brigade took a southwesterly direction, diagonally across Young's Branch valley, under the cover of the rising ground to its south, until it had reached the junction of the Sudley Springs road with the Warrenton Turnpike, and then ascended the slope along the former, which had a sufficient depression to protect the troops against the fire of the enemy until they had reached a point west of and nearly opposite the Henry House and about 150 yds. distant therefrom, thus constituting what at that moment was the extreme right of the Federal position. Let us turn to that portion of Sher-



~~Col.~~ later Gen. W. T. Sherman.

man's official report referring to what immediately followed :

“ Before reaching the crest of the hill the roadway was worn deep enough to afford shelter, and I kept the several regiments in it as long as possible ; but when the Wisconsin Second was abreast of the enemy, by order of Maj. Wadsworth, of Gen. McDowell's staff, I ordered it to leave the roadway by the left flank and to attack the enemy. This regiment ascended to the brow of the hill steadily, received the severe fire of the enemy, returned it with spirit, and advanced delivering its fire. This regiment is uniformed in gray cloth, almost identical with that of the great bulk of the secession army, and when the regiment fled in confusion and retreated toward the road, there was a universal cry that they were being fired upon by our own men. The regiment rallied again, passed the brow of the hill a second time, and was again repulsed in disorder. By this time the New York Seventy-ninth had closed up, and in like manner it was ordered to

“ cross the brow of the hill and
 “ drive the enemy from cover. It
 “ was impossible to get a good
 “ view of the ground. In it there
 “ was one battery of artillery,
 “ which poured an incessant fire
 “ upon our advancing column, and
 “ the ground was irregular, with
 “ small clusters of pines, affording
 “ shelter, of which the enemy took
 “ good advantage. The fire of
 “ rifles and musketry was very
 “ severe. The Seventy-ninth,
 “ headed by its colonel (Came-
 “ ron), charged across the hill,
 “ and for a short time the con-
 “ test was severe. They rallied
 “ several times under fire, but
 “ finally broke and gained the
 “ cover of the hill. This left the
 “ field open to the New York Six-
 “ ty-ninth, Col. Corcoran, who, in
 “ his turn, led his regiment over
 “ the crest, and had in full open
 “ view the ground so severely con-
 “ tested. The firing was very se-
 “ vere, and the roar of cannon,
 “ musketry and rifles incessant. It
 “ was manifest the enemy was here
 “ in great force, far superior to us
 “ at that point. The Sixty-ninth
 “ held the ground for some time,
 “ but finally fell back in disorder.”
 The fall of the gallant Col. Cam-
 eron, of the New York Seventy-
 ninth (known as the Highlanders),
 is thus described in a letter written
 by Capt. Ellis, of that regiment, to
 his lieutenant colonel who was not
 present during that battle :
 “ When near the top (of the Henry
 “ hill), we were met by most de-
 “ structive volleys of cannon and
 “ small arms. But the regiment
 “ stood its ground. Compelled at
 “ length to seek the cover of the
 “ hillside to reform our decimated
 “ ranks, Col. Cameron endeavored
 “ to obtain ammunition to work five
 “ guns of Ricketts' (?) battery, which
 “ were lying useless, as horses and
 “ gunners were slain. Not succeed-
 “ ing in this, he again rushed into
 “ the hottest fire, when I saw him
 “ throw up his arms and fall. Lieut.

“ S. R. Elliot and myself ran to his assistance, but life was extinct ; he had been shot through the breast with a large rifle ball. Capt. Laing came up at the same instant. * * * * I then called to some of our men, and lifting the body upon crossed muskets, we bore it away.”

The chief of artillery of the Federal army, Maj. Barry, reports the total number of guns attached to Gen. McDowell's army as forty-nine, of which only twenty-four crossed Bull Run and took part in the battle. These were as follows : Griffin's, six guns ; Ricketts', six guns ; Arnold's, four guns ; Second Rhode Island Rgt's, six guns ; and lastly, two boat howitzers attached to the New York Seventy-first, which last were without horses, being drawn by hand by detachments of men from the regiment. The first Northern battery to arrive on the field was the Rhode Island Second, followed by the two guns of the New York Seventy-first, then by Griffin's, a little later by Ricketts', and lastly by Arnold's battery. The first position occupied by these batteries was on the elevation to the north of the Henry House, where took place the first rencontre of the infantry ; but when the scene of battle shifted to the grounds around the Henry House, some thousand yards distant, Gen. McDowell thought that the fire of his guns would be more effective if they also were advanced to the latter position, and he ordered accordingly that two batteries be transferred to that elevation, indicating at the same time the position they were to occupy. The order was executed by Maj. Barry, who chose the batteries of Ricketts' and Griffin's for the duty. Concerning this interesting incident, upon which the fate of the day seems so much to have hung, there has been much discussion, and it will not perhaps be amiss to quote portions of the testimony given before the Congressional Investigating Committee on

the Conduct of the War during the following year by several of the officers concerned in that movement. Captain Griffin, commanding one of the batteries, testified as follows :



Capt. later Gen. Chas. Griffin.

“ Washington, January 14, 1862.

“ Capt. Charles Griffin sworn and examined.

“ By Chairman : * * * * *

“ Question.—Were you at Bull Run at the time of the battle there in July last ?

“ Answer.—Yes, sir.

“ Question.—Under whose command ?

“ Answer.—I was attached to General Andrew Porter's brigade, which belonged to General Hunter's division.

“ Question.—Will you please inform us what, according to your best judgment, led to the disasters of that day ?

“ Answer.—I can tell you what occurred on the right, where I was. I was brought into battery about half past 11, and opened on the enemy's artillery. I should

“suppose it maintained its position
 “for about a half an hour, when it
 “retired. I changed position two
 “or three times, and opened upon
 “their infantry. It also retired,
 “and as far as my observation went,
 “we were successful in all parts of
 “the field. There was a lull; we
 “had nothing to fire at. Then
 “Major Barry (now General Barry)
 “approached me and said that it
 “was General McDowell’s order for
 “us to move on a hill about a thou-
 “sand yards distant, where the ene-
 “my’s battery was that I had fired
 “at. I hesitated about going there,
 “because I had no support. I was
 “told the Fire Zouaves would sup-
 “port us. We started for the hill,
 “and halted once or twice. Once I
 “went to Major Barry and told him
 “I had no support; that it was im-
 “possible to go there without a sup-
 “port. He told me that the Fire
 “Zouaves would support us; that
 “they were just ready to take the
 “double quick and follow us. I
 “told him if such was the case, I
 “wished he would permit them to
 “go and get into position on the
 “hill—let the batteries (Captain
 “Ricketts’ and mine) come into po-
 “sition behind them; and then let
 “them fall back. And I told him
 “the better place for our battery
 “was on a hill about 500 yards in
 “the rear of the one to which we
 “were then ordered. He said that
 “General McDowell’s order was to
 “go to the other hill; and he also
 “refused to let the Fire Zouaves go
 “on the hill first and form into line.
 “I told him they would not support
 “us. He said they would. He
 “said, ‘Yes, they will; at any rate,
 “it is General McDowell’s order to
 “go there.’ I said, ‘I will go; but
 “mark my words, they will not
 “support us.’ In going to the hill
 “my first lieutenant went towards
 “another place, and I had to give
 “the order to countermarch, and go
 “on the hill indicated. The turn-
 “ing off there by my first lieutenant
 “threw Ricketts’ battery to the

“front. We got on the hill and
 “fired about half an hour, when I
 “moved two of my pieces to the
 “right of Ricketts’ battery. We
 “were then firing upon the enemy’s
 “battery, which was not certainly
 “over 300, if it was 250, yards from
 “us. I had only five pieces there.
 “One of my pieces had had a ball
 “lodged in the bore so that it could
 “not be got in or out. I had five
 “pieces there, and Ricketts’ had
 “six, making eleven pieces side by
 “side. As I said, I moved these
 “pieces to the right of Ricketts’
 “battery, and commenced firing.
 “After I had been there about five
 “minutes, a regiment of confeder-
 “ates got over a fence on my front,
 “and some officer (I took it to be
 “the colonel) stepped out in front
 “of the regiment, between it and
 “my battery, and commenced mak-
 “ing a speech to them. I gave the
 “command to one of my officers to
 “fire upon them. He loaded the
 “cannon with canister, and was
 “just ready to fire upon them, when
 “Maj. Barry rode up to me and said,
 “‘Captain, don’t fire there; those
 “are your battery support.’ I said,
 “‘They are confederates; as certain
 “as the world, they are confed-
 “erates.’ He replied, ‘I know they
 “are your battery support.’ I
 “sprang to my pieces and told my
 “officer not to fire there. He threw
 “down the canister, and commenced
 “firing again in the former direc-
 “tion. After the officer who had
 “been talking to the regiment had
 “got through, he faced them to the
 “left, and marched them about fifty
 “yards to the woods, then faced
 “them to the right again, and
 “marched them about forty yards
 “towards us, and then opened fire
 “upon us, and that was the last of
 “us. I had about fifty horses killed
 “that day. I had had several horses
 “and some men killed before. Be-
 “fore this occurred I started to lim-
 “ber up my pieces, so thoroughly
 “convinced was I that they were
 “the confederates. But as the chief

“ of artillery told me they were my
 “ battery support, I was afraid to
 “ fire upon them. Major Barry said,
 “ ‘I know it is the battery support ;
 “ it is the regiment taken there by
 “ Colonel ——.’ ‘Very well,’ said
 “ I, and gave the command to fire
 “ in another direction with the bat-
 “ tery. But I never delivered the
 “ fire, for we were all cut down.
 “ The Zouaves were about twenty
 “ yards to the rear of us ; they were
 “ sitting down. I begged them to
 “ come up and give them a volley
 “ and then try the bayonet. They
 “ did not run at first, but stood as
 “ if panic stricken. I do not believe
 “ they fired fifty shots, certainly not
 “ over one hundred. And after they
 “ had received three, perhaps four,
 “ volleys from this regiment of con-
 “ federates, they broke and ran. I
 “ went down the hill and found
 “ Major Barry at the stream water-
 “ ing his horse. I stopped to water
 “ my horse also. Said I, ‘Major, do
 “ you think the Zouaves will sup-
 “ port us?’ Said he, ‘I was mis-
 “ taken.’ Said I, ‘Do you think that
 “ was our support?’ ‘I was mis-
 “ taken,’ he said. ‘Yes,’ said I,
 “ ‘you were mistaken all around.’
 “ I can substantiate all this if any-
 “ thing is said to the contrary.
 “ There are living witnesses to sup-
 “ port it. Lieutenant Read stood
 “ by my side and heard the conver-
 “ sation about the battery support.

“ Question by Mr. Chandler.—
 “ Could you have cut up that regi-
 “ ment with a charge of canister so
 “ that they would not have charged
 “ upon you ?

“ Answer.—I could have staggered
 “ them terribly. While the colonel
 “ was making his speech to them
 “ we had plenty of time to have
 “ passed word along the whole line,
 “ and if the whole eleven guns had
 “ been turned upon them, they could
 “ not have touched us.

“ Question.—Was that the com-
 “ mencement of the repulse ?

“ Answer.—Yes, sir ; the first I
 “ saw of it. We had been advanc-

“ ing gradually before that. The
 “ report of General Andrew Porter
 “ is the best testimony of that.

“ By the Chairman :

“ Question.—What time was that ?

“ Answer.—About 3 o’clock, ear-
 “ lier or later—later if anything. I
 “ should suppose it was not far from
 “ that time.

“ Question.—What happened af-
 “ ter that ?

“ Answer.—Well, sir, I got off the
 “ field with one piece, there being
 “ one wheel horse and one lead
 “ horse to the piece. That piece I
 “ only got off about a thousand
 “ yards. I got off the field two
 “ pieces—two Parrott guns—the one
 “ that the ball lodged in, and one
 “ with ths horses attached to it.

* * * *

“ Question.—And your judgment
 “ is that if the batteries had been
 “ supported by four thousand men,
 “ they could not have been driven
 “ from their position ?

“ Answer.—Yes, sir ; I have no
 “ idea they could.

“ Question.—And if your batteries
 “ had retained their position there,
 “ would there have been any repulse
 “ at that time in that part of the
 “ field ?

“ Answer.—I do not believe there
 “ would. I believe if I had been
 “ allowed to take the position I
 “ wanted to go, and to which Cap-
 “ tain Kensel wanted to go, we
 “ would not have lost our batteries.
 “ Captain Ricketts is living, and I
 “ understand that he refused to
 “ move forward. When Lieutenant
 “ Snyder, of the engineers, who
 “ died a few weeks ago, came up to
 “ him, Captain Ricketts said to him,
 “ ‘Snyder, I have such an order to
 “ move forward.’ Lieutenant Sny-
 “ der said, ‘You have the best posi-
 “ tion in the world ; stand fast, and
 “ I will go and see General Mc-
 “ Dowell.’ He went, and came
 “ back and said that General Mc-
 “ Dowell would comply with Major
 “ Barry’s orders. That was very

“ proper and polite in General McDowell, for Major Barry was his chief of staff; but it shows that the officers of my battery were not the only ones who thought we should not have been moved forward. General Andrew Porter came to me after the battle, and spoke very severely. Said he, ‘Sir, I want to know how you got into such a situation.’ I said, ‘I went in accordance with the order of General Barry from General McDowell.’ General Porter had told me that he relied upon me, as I was his only battery. He said, ‘When I found you had gone a thousand yards in advance, I cannot tell you my feelings. I was afraid I had allowed you to go there upon my order.’ He felt, perhaps, that I had gone there upon my discretion.

* * * *

“ Question.—How many of your horses were killed by the fire of this regiment?

“ Answer.—I should suppose there were thirty or forty killed?



Capt. later Gen. Jas. B. Ricketts.

“Washington, April 3, 1862.

“ General James B. Ricketts sworn
 “ and examined.

“ By the Chairman :

“ Question.—What was your rank
 “ on the 21st of July last, the day
 “ of the battle of Bull Run?

“ Answer.—I was a captain of
 “ the first regiment of artillery.

“ Question.—In what brigade?

“ Answer.—General Franklin’s
 “ brigade.

“ Question.—Will you please give
 “ us an account in your own way,
 “ of what you saw of the battle?

“ Answer.—I saw very little ex-
 “ cept what concerned myself. You
 “ must know that any one who has
 “ charge of six pieces of artillery,
 “ has as much as he can attend to
 “ to manage them and obey orders.

“ I went on the field at Sudley’s
 “ Spring, in General Heintzelman’s
 “ division, General Franklin’s bri-
 “ gade. After crossing the stream,

“ where I watered my horses, my
 “ first order was to take to the right
 “ into an open field, to effect which

“ I had to take down the fences. I
 “ then came into action about a
 “ thousand yards from the enemy, I

“ should judge. There was a bat-
 “ tery of smooth bores opposed
 “ against me, doing some damage

“ to us; it killed some horses and
 “ wounded some few of my men;

“ I myself saw one man struck on
 “ the arm. My battery consisted

“ of six rifled Parrott guns, conse-
 “ quently I was more than a match
 “ at that distance for the smooth-

“ bore battery. It is difficult to
 “ judge of the passage of time un-
 “ der such circumstances, as we nev-

“ er look at our watches then. But
 “ after firing, I should judge, twenty

“ minutes or a half an hour, I had
 “ orders to advance a certain dis-
 “ tance. I moved forward, and was

“ about to come into battery again,
 “ when I was ordered to proceed
 “ further on, up on a hill near the
 “ Henry House.

“ By Mr. Chandler :

“ Question.—About what time was it when you first came into action?”

“ Answer.—We had marched twelve miles. I should judge my first coming into action must have been somewhere about noon. That, of course, is a mere guess. I received this order to move forward. I told the officer that he must indicate the spot, so that there should be no mistake about it. I saw at a glance, as I thought, that I was going into great peril for my horses and men. But I did not hesitate to obey the order, merely asking to have the spot clearly indicated to me. The ground had not been reconnoitred at all, and there was a little ravine in front that I had to pass. As I marched at the head of my company with Lieutenant Ramsay, he said to me, ‘We cannot pass that ravine.’ I told him that we must pass it. As we were under fire, to countermarch there would be fatal. The confusion consequent upon turning around there would expose us to great danger. As it was, we dashed across, breaking one wheel in the effort, which we immediately replaced. I called off the cannoniers and took down the fence and ascended the hill near the Henry House, which was at that time filled with sharpshooters. I had scarcely got into battery before I saw some of my horses fall and some of my men wounded by the sharpshooters. I turned my guns upon the house and literally riddled it. It has been said that there was a woman killed there by our guns. It was in that house that she was killed at the time I turned my battery on it and shelled out the sharpshooters there. We did not move from that position—that is, we made no important movement. We moved a piece one way or the other, perhaps, in order to take advantage of the enemy’s appearance at one point or another.

“ But our guns were not again limbered up. In fact, in a very short time we were not in a position or a condition to move, on account of the number of our horses that were disabled. I know it was the hottest place I ever saw in my life, and I had seen some fighting before. The enemy had taken advantage of the woods and the natural slope of the ground, and delivered a terrible fire upon us.

“ Question.—Was that the place where your battery was lost?”

“ Answer.—Yes, sir.

“ Question.—And where you yourself was wounded and fell?”

“ Answer.—Yes, sir.

“ Question.—Who gave you the order to march forward there?”

“ Answer.—Lieutenant Kingsbury, of General McDowell’s staff, brought me the order. Lieutenant Snyder was also near, and I told him I wanted him to bear in mind that I had received that order, although no point was indicated.”

The chief of artillery of McDowell’s army, Major Barry, in his official report, refers to this incident in the following manner:

“ Returning to the position occupied by Ricketts’ and Griffin’s batteries, I received an order from Gen. McDowell to advance two batteries to an eminence, specially designated by him, about 800 yards in front of the line previously occupied by the enemy’s batteries. I therefore ordered these two batteries to move forward at once, and, as soon as they were in motion, went for and secured as supports the 11th (Fire Zouaves) and the 14th (Brooklyn) New York regiments. I accompanied the former regiment to guide it to its proper position, and Col. Heintzelman, 17th United States Infantry, performed the same service for the 14th on the right of the 11th. A squadron of United States cavalry, under Captain Colburn, 1st Cavalry, was subsequently ordered as additional support. We were soon

“ upon the ground designated, and
 “ the two batteries at once opened
 “ a very effective fire upon the ene-
 “ my’s left. The new position had
 “ scarcely been occupied, when a
 “ troop of the enemy’s cavalry, de-
 “ bauching from a piece of woods
 “ close upon our right flank, charged
 “ down upon the New York 11th.
 “ The Zouaves catching sight of the
 “ cavalry a few moments before they
 “ were upon them, broke ranks to
 “ such a degree that the cavalry
 “ dashed through without doing
 “ them much harm. The Zouaves
 “ gave them a scattering fire as they
 “ passed, which emptied five saddles
 “ and killed three horses. A few
 “ minutes afterwards a regiment of
 “ the enemy’s infantry, covered by
 “ a high fence, presented itself in
 “ line on the left and front of the
 “ two batteries, at not more than 60
 “ or 70 yards’ distance, and deliv-
 “ ered a volley full upon the bat-
 “ teries and their supports. Lieut.
 “ Ramsay, 1st Artillery, was killed,
 “ and Captain Ricketts, 1st Artillery,
 “ was wounded, and a number of
 “ men and horses were killed or dis-
 “ abled by this close and well di-
 “ rected volley. The 11th and 14th
 “ regiments instantly broke, and
 “ fled in confusion to the rear, and,
 “ in spite of the repeated and earn-
 “ est efforts of Col. Heintzelman
 “ with the latter, and myself with
 “ the former, refused to rally and
 “ return to the support of the bat-
 “ teries. The enemy, seeing the
 “ guns thus abandoned by their sup-
 “ ports, rushed upon them, and driv-
 “ ing off the cannoniers, who with
 “ their officers stood bravely at their
 “ posts until the last moment, cap-
 “ tured them, ten in number.”

Gen. W. W. Averell, at that time
 lieutenant of regular cavalry, and
 acting as assistant adjutant general
 to Gen. Andrew Porter, command-
 ing First Brigade of Second Divi-
 sion, makes the following statement
 in his testimony before the Congres-
 sional Investigating Committee on
 the Conduct of the War :

“ I immediately rode over to the
 “ right of the field and inquired
 “ where Gen. McDowell was. I
 “ found him on top of a little hill in
 “ a little field beyond the turnpike.
 “ In going over I had spoken to the
 “ 14th, and told them to push up to
 “ the woods on the right of Griffin’s
 “ battery. They went forward fine-
 “ ly in line. I followed the 14th,
 “ going around the right flank of it,
 “ and got up on the hill where Gen.
 “ McDowell was. Gen. McDowell
 “ called out to the colonel of the
 “ 14th to march the regiment by
 “ flank. There was probably a de-
 “ lay of two or three minutes in ex-
 “ ecuting that movement. I spoke,
 “ then, to the General, and said :
 “ ‘General, if that battery goes up
 “ on the hill it will be lost ; the
 “ woods are full of the enemy, for I
 “ have seen them there.’ I had
 “ then been on the ground seven
 “ hours watching closely with a
 “ glass all the movements. Said I,
 “ ‘For heaven’s sake let the 14th go
 “ up in the woods.’ Marching them
 “ by flank, changing the movement,
 “ was sending them up in rear of
 “ the battery, where they could have
 “ no effect upon the enemy on the
 “ flank. Gen. McDowell said, ‘Go
 “ and take the 14th where you want
 “ it.’ I immediately went to the
 “ 14th, changed its direction to the
 “ woods, and told it to take the
 “ double quick. The battery was
 “ still moving. The General said it
 “ was too late to recall the move-
 “ ment. I was so apprehensive that
 “ the battery would meet with a
 “ disaster there that I rode up to
 “ where the battery was. The ma-
 “ rines were then sitting down in
 “ close column on the ground on
 “ the left of the battery. The bat-
 “ tery was then getting into posi-
 “ tion and unlimbering. The fire
 “ zouaves were still in rear of the
 “ battery. The zouaves immedi-
 “ ately commenced a movement,
 “ rose up and moved off in rear of
 “ the battery, a little to the right.
 “ I rode up then to the left of the

“ battery, and there met Col. Heintzelman. I saw some troops immediately in front of us, not over 75 or 100 yards off. I should say it was at least a regiment; we could see their heads and faces very plainly. I said to Col. Heintzelman: ‘What troops are those in front of us?’ He was looking off in another direction. I said: ‘Here, right in front of the battery.’ I do not remember the reply he made, but I dropped my reins and took up my glasses to look at them, and just at that moment down came their pieces, rifles and muskets, and probably there never was such a destructive fire for a few minutes. It seemed as though every man and horse of that battery just laid right down and died right off. It was half a minute—it seemed longer—before I could get my horse down out of the fire. I then went to the marines and halloed to them to hurry on. Their officers were standing behind them keeping them in ranks; but the destruction of the battery was so complete that the marines and zouaves seemed to be struck with such astonishment, such consternation, that they could not do anything. There were probably 100 muskets fired from the zouaves and marines—not over that; and they, of course, fired too high. They were below the battery, and where the battery was we could not see more than half of the bodies of the rebels, and what they did fire was ineffective. They began to break and run down the hill, and nothing could stop them, and then the enemy rushed right over there like a lowering cloud—right over the hill.

“ Question.—Why did not the batteries open upon those men in front?

“ Answer.—I do not know from actual operation why they did not. The battery was unlimbered and the men were standing at the guns.

“ In going down the hill, after the general wreck, I saw an officer galloping along a little in front of me. I recognized Major Barry, and cried out ‘Halloo, Barry, is that you?’ He said, ‘Yes.’ Said I, ‘Where is Griffin?’ He said, ‘I am afraid he is killed.’ I said, ‘That battery is lost; I am afraid we are gone up,’ or some remark to that effect. Barry then said: ‘I am to blame for the loss of that battery. I put Griffin there myself.’ Well, the 14th, by this time, had reached the woods on the right. The 38th New York, which led the column on the left, which we intended to support when they got there, had reached this little cross-road, and the 14th and 38th held on very well—indeed, splendidly. The enemy came right over the brow of the hill, and their fire was very deadly. They made a rush over the top of the hill, and their cavalry made their appearance at the same time; the 14th and 38th hung on for fifteen minutes there, while all the officers about there tried to collect these scattered troops and get them back to that position to the assistance of the 14th and 38th, and appealed to them in every way that possibly could be done. But it was of no avail. What there was left of the battery, a few limbers and caissons that had live horses to drag them, came galloping down the hill, right through this mass of running troops, and occasionally a horse would fall, and the whole thing would get all tangled up.

“ Question.—Was or not that the beginning of the panic?

“ Answer.—That was the turning point of the affair, right there.”

It will perhaps be interesting to give a brief extract from the evidence of Gen. Jas. S. Wadsworth before the Investigating Committee, as to the causes which led to the defeat of the Northern army in that battle. Gen. Wadsworth then held

the rank of major and acted during that day as volunteer aid upon the staff of Gen. McDowell. Among other responses to the Committee were the following :

“ By the Chairman :

“ Question.—Suppose that Johnston had not come down, but had been kept back, what would have been the result ?

“ Answer.—Take out the whole of Johnston’s command, and the victory would have been very easily won. But take out the portion of his command that came down under Gen. Elger (Elzey) about three o’clock in the afternoon, and I still think the battle would have been won by us, but we could not say exactly. But we were holding our own, and had other troops to bring up. It is not certain that we should have won the battle, but Gen. McDowell thought we should. I was where that re-enforcement arrived. I happened to be where the first discharge of musketry from that re-enforcement came in. It was very severe, and then they followed it up immediately with a very bold charge right on the field. They came through a piece of woods on to the battlefield,” etc.

The following extract contains Gen. McDowell’s account of the commencement of the retreat :

“ It was at this time that the enemy’s reinforcements came to his aid from the railroad train, understood to have just arrived from the valley with the residue of Johnston’s army. They threw themselves in the woods on our right, and towards the rear of our right, and opened a fire of musketry on our men, which caused them to break and retire down the hillside. This soon degenerated into disorder, for which there was no remedy. Every effort was made to rally them, even beyond the reach of the enemy’s fire, but in vain. The battalion of regular infantry alone moved up the hill

“ opposite to the one with the house on it, and there maintained itself until our men could get down to and across the Warrenton turnpike, on the way back to the position we occupied in the morning. The plain was covered with retreating troops, and they seemed to infect those with whom they came in contact. The retreat soon became a rout, and this degenerated still further into a panic. Finding this state of affairs was beyond the efforts of all those who had assisted so faithfully during the long and hard day’s work in gaining almost the object of our wishes, and that nothing remained on the field but to recognize what we could no longer prevent, I gave the necessary orders to protect their withdrawal.”

Col. Sherman, referring to the left center of the field, says in his official report : “ Here (about 3:30 p. m.) began the scene of disorder and confusion that characterized the remainder of the day.”

Col. Andrew Porter, commanding the First Brigade of the Second Division, thus describes the closing scenes of that day :

“ The evanescent courage of the “ Zouaves ” prompted them to fire perhaps a hundred shots, when they broke and fled, leaving the batteries open to a charge of the enemy’s cavalry, which took place immediately. The marines also, in spite of the exertions of their gallant officers, gave way in disorder. The 14th, on the right, and the column on the left, hesitatingly retired, with the exception of the 69th and 38th New York, who nobly stood and returned the fire of the enemy for fifteen minutes. Soon the slopes behind us were swarming with our retreating and disorganized forces, while riderless horses and artillery teams ran furiously through the flying crowd. All further efforts were futile. The words, gestures, and threats of our officers were thrown

“ away upon men who had lost all
 “ presence of mind, and only longed
 “ for absence of body. Some of our
 “ noblest and best officers lost their
 “ lives in trying to rally them.
 “ Upon our first position the 27th
 “ was the first to rally, under the
 “ command of Major Bartlett, and
 “ around it the other regiments en-
 “ gaged soon collected their scat-
 “ tered fragments. The battalion
 “ of regulars, in the meantime,
 “ moved steadily across the field
 “ from the left to the right, and
 “ took up a position, where it held
 “ the entire force of rebels in check
 “ until our forces were somewhat
 “ rallied. The commanding general
 “ then ordered a retreat upon Cen-
 “ terville, at the same time direct-
 “ ing me to cover it with the bat-
 “ talion of regulars, the cavalry
 “ and a section of artillery. The
 “ rear guard thus organized followed
 “ our panic-stricken troops to Cen-
 “ terville, resisting the attacks of
 “ the rebel cavalry and artillery,
 “ and saving them from the inevi-
 “ table destruction which awaited
 “ them had not this body been in-
 “ terposed.”

Major Sykes, commanding the reg-
 ulars just referred to, and which con-
 sisted of eight companies, makes the
 following statement in his official
 report :

“ As the attack of our army be-
 “ came more developed on the
 “ right, and the necessity of my
 “ staying with the guns, 2nd R. I.
 “ Battery ceased, I moved my bat-
 “ talion in that direction, passing
 “ through crowds of retiring troops
 “ whom we endeavored in vain to
 “ rally. Taking a position on the
 “ extreme right in front of several
 “ regiments of the enemy, I opened
 “ an effective fire upon them, and
 “ held my ground until all our
 “ troops had fallen back, and my
 “ flank was turned by a large force
 “ of horse and foot. I then retired
 “ a short distance in good order, and
 “ facing the enemy on the crest of
 “ a hill, held his cavalry in check,

“ which still threatened our flank.
 “ At this stage of the action, my
 “ command was the only opposing
 “ force to the enemy, and the last
 “ to leave the field.”

Col. Heintzelman, referring to the
 last detachments of the Federal
 troops to leave the field, says in his
 official report: “ Finding it impos-
 “ sible to rally any of the regiments,
 “ we commenced our retreat about
 “ half-past four P. M.”

During the retreat the greater
 part of the commands, when brought
 into proximity with each other, be-
 came intermingled and lost their
 organization. This, of course, added
 much to the general confusion and
 panic prevailing.

Arnold's battery left the field with
 all four of its guns, and the Second
 Rhode Island battery was able to
 withdraw five of its pieces. But on
 reaching the bridge over Cub Run,
 a stream two miles to the west of
 Centerville, and, therefore, between
 that village and the battlefield, they
 found the passage of the bridge
 wholly blocked, caused by a cannon
 shot from one of the enemy's guns
 overturning in the middle of the
 bridge a caisson, and thus bringing
 to a stand still all vehicles of the re-
 treating army still remaining to the
 west of the stream. The banks to
 the right and left were too precipi-
 tous to admit of the passage of teams.
 The drivers, therefore, cut the traces,
 and rode away on the horses. It
 was at this bridge then that the nine
 pieces of artillery above referred to
 fell into the hands of the enemy,
 together with a considerable quan-
 tity of munitions and other military
 stores.

Now let us turn our attention
 more particularly to the part played
 by the Southern army in the events
 of that day. From intelligence re-
 ceived through secret channels hold-
 ing relations with the governmental
 departments at Washington Gen.
 Beauregard, the commander-in-chief
 of the Southern Army of the Poto-
 mac, was informed of the plan of

the Federals to attempt an expedition into the northern part of Virginia with a view of severing the connections between his army, near Manassas, with that of Gen. Johnston, near Winchester, and then destroying them separately, before they could extend material aid to each other.

Gen. Beauregard established the base of his operations at Manassas, where he caused defensive works of considerable importance to be thrown up, and disposed his available forces along the line of Bull Run, as has been already stated, from the ford opposite Manassas (Union Mills), and extending some seven miles to the Stone Bridge, which he then considered as the furthest probable point of attack in that direction. He forwarded, at the same time, the information he had received from Washington, to the Confederate Government at Richmond, advising a junction of Johnston's army with his. The Richmond authorities left the

upon a junction at the earliest moment between the two armies, if he could elude the army of Gen. Patterson, then confronting him and



Gen. Jos. E. Johnson.



Gen. G. T. Beauregard.

decision of the matter in a large measure to the discretion of General Johnston, who immediately decided

watching his movements. This he succeeded in doing, and reached Manassas in person about noon of the 20th, where he had already been preceded by seven regiments of his army. Out-ranking Beauregard, he assumed command of the joint forces, and accepted in toto the plans already formed by the former. On the morning of the battle of the 21st, the following is the order in which the forces of the Southern army were posted along Bull Run: Ewell's brigade before Union Mills Ford, supported by Holmes' brigade in the rear; D. R. Jones' brigade before McLean's Ford, and preserving connection with Ewell's command on the right and Longstreet's on the left, with Early's brigade in the rear as support; Longstreet's brigade before Blackburn's Ford, where it had been in the skirmish of the preceding 18th, and extending its wings to form an uninterrupted connection with Jones' troops on the right and Bonham on the left, with Jackson's brigade as support, to-

gether with Bee's and Bartow's troops after their arrival; before Mitchell's Ford was Bonham's brigade, which kept at the same time intact the connections between the two fords on his right and left; while Cocke's brigade occupied the line of the stream between Mitchell's Ford and the Stone Bridge, at which last place was stationed a demi-brigade under Col. Evans, also reporting to Gen. Cocke.

The first plan conceived by Gen. Beauregard and approved by Gen. Johnston for relieving the pressure of the enemy upon the extreme left flank, was to cross Bull Run at one of the fords opposite Manassas, and advance upon the Federal position near Centerville, thereby threatening his communication with his base at Washington. To this end orders were sent early in the morning of the 21st to Ewell, before Union Mills Ford, to cross the stream and advance upon the Federals; and at the same time, he ordered the other commands posted along the water course, to follow and support Ewell in the order of their positions; that is, Jones, Longstreet and Bonham, together with the reserves supporting them.

As we have seen, upon the discovery by Col. Evans of the flanking movement of the Northern army, he at once transferred the major part of his command from its position before the Stone Bridge to his rear, to intercept the advance of the enemy. About 10:30 A. M., shortly after the time when the Northern columns debouched from the woods in front of Evans' new position, Generals Beauregard and Johnston, who were anxiously listening for sounds of the attack on the Federals' rear at Centerville by Gen. Ewell's brigade, received a dispatch from the latter, informing them that the order for his advance, issued early in the morning, had never reached him, but that, in consequence of a communication from Gen. Jones, received but a short time before, he had thrown his brigade across the

stream. The day was so far advanced, and the development of the attack of the enemy on the extreme left had reached such a point that it was decided advisable to abandon the attack on Centerville. Maintaining, therefore, at the several fords a force sufficient to hold in check any probable effort on the part of the Union forces to effect a passage, the remainder of the Southern army was hurried to the extreme left to arrest, if possible, the progress of the flanking movement of the Northern army. When the broken fragments of the commands of Bee, Bartow and Evans reached the Henry House hill in their retreat from the first position taken by them, Jackson's brigade of five reg-



"Stonewall" Jackson.

iments and Hampton's Legion, 600 strong, were already posted in a judicious position awaiting the onrush of the enemy.

After a series of spirited contests between different portions of the opposing forces with varying success, Gen. Beauregard ordered about 2:00 P. M., a general charge of all

his troops then facing the Federals on the Henry House elevation, except his reserves, and the plateau was cleared of the enemy.

He says in his official report that "the Federal lines were broken and swept back at all points from the open ground of the plateau."

The second general charge of the Confederates is thus described by Beauregard in his official report :

"By this time, between half past two and three o'clock, P. M., our reinforcements pushed forward, and directed by Gen. Johnston to the required quarter, were at hand just as I had ordered forward to the second effort for the recovery of the disputed plateau the whole line, including my reserves, which, at this crisis of the battle, I felt called upon to lead in person. This attack was general and was shared in by every regiment in the field, including the 6th, Fish-

ers', North Carolina Rgt., which had just come up and taken position to the immediate left of the



Col. Bartow.



Gen. Bee.

"49th Va. Rgt. The whole open ground was again swept clear of the enemy." Further on in the same paragraph he continues:— "This part of the day was rich with deeds of individual coolness and dauntless conduct, as well as well-directed, embodied resolution and bravery, but fraught with the loss to the service of the country of lives of inestimable preciousness at this juncture. The brave Bee was mortally wounded at the head of the 4th Alabama Rgt. and some Mississippians in the open field near the Henry House, and a few yards distant, the promising life of Bartow, while leading the 7th Georgia Rgt., was quenched in blood. Col. F. J. Thomas, Acting Chief of Ordnance, of Gen. Johnston's Staff, was also slain. Col. Fisher—6th North Carolina—likewise fell, after soldierly behavior, at the head of his regiment, with ranks greatly thinned." Then again, further on, he says: "Preston's Regiment, of Cocke's Bri-

“ gade, had by that time entered
 “ the same body of oaks,* and en-
 “ countered some Michigan troops,
 “ capturing their Brigade Comman-
 “ der, Col. Wilcox. Another im-
 “ portant acquisition to our forces
 “ had also occurred about the same
 “ time, 3:00 P. M. Brigadier Gen.
 “ E. K. Smith with some 1,700 in-
 “ fantry of Elzey’s Brigade of the
 “ Army of the Shenandoah, and
 “ Beckham’s Battery came upon the
 “ field from Camp Pickens, Manas-
 “ sas, where they had arrived by
 “ railroad at noon. Directed in per-
 “ son by Gen. Johnston to the left,
 “ then so much endangered, on
 “ reaching a position in the rear of
 “ the oak woods south of the Henry
 “ House, and immediately east of
 “ the Sudley Road Gen. Smith was
 “ disabled by a severe wound, and
 “ his valuable services were lost at
 “ that critical juncture.” Then a
 little further on follows a descrip-
 tion of the final causes which led to
 the retreat of the Northern army :
 “ At this time, about 3:30, P. M.,
 “ the enemy driven back on their
 “ left and center and brushed from



Gen. Jubal A. Early.

*On the extreme left of the Confederate position.

“ the woods south and west of the
 “ Henry House, had formed a line
 “ of battle of truly formidable pro-
 “ portions of crescent outline * * *
 “ It was a truly magnificent though
 “ redoubtable spectacle as they
 “ threw forward in fine style on the
 “ broad gentle slopes of the ridge
 “ occupied by their main lines, a
 “ cloud of skirmishers, preparatory
 “ for another attack. But as Early
 “ formed his line, and Beckham’s
 “ pieces played upon the right of
 “ the enemy, Elzey’s Brigade, Gib-
 “ bon’s 10th Virginia, Lieut. Col.
 “ Stuart’s 1st Maryland, and Vaugh-
 “ an’s 3rd Tennessee Regiments, and
 “ Cash’s 8th and Kershaw’s 2nd
 “ South Carolina, Withers’ 18th and
 “ Preston’s 28th Virginia, advanced
 “ in an irregular line, almost simul-
 “ taneously, with great spirit from
 “ their several positions, upon the
 “ front and flanks of the enemy, in
 “ their quarter of the field. At the
 “ same time, too, Early resolutely
 “ assailed their right flank and rear.
 “ Under this combined attack, the
 “ enemy was soon forced, first over
 “ the narrow plateau in the southern
 “ angle made by the two roads
 “ then mentioned, into a patch
 “ of woods on its western slope,
 “ thence back over Young’s
 “ Branch and the Turnpike into
 “ fields of the Dogan Farm, and
 “ rearward in extreme disorder,
 “ in all available directions, to-
 “ wards Bull Run. The rout had
 “ now become general and com-
 “ plete. * * * * Col. Radford,
 “ with six companies of Virginia
 “ cavalry, was also ordered by
 “ Gen. Johnston to cross Bull
 “ Run and attack the enemy from
 “ the direction of Lewis’s House ;
 “ conducted by one of my Aids,
 “ Colonel Chisholm, by the Lewis
 “ Ford, to the immediate vicinity
 “ of the Suspension Bridge, he
 “ charged a battery with great
 “ gallantry, took Colonel Corco-
 “ ran, of the 69th regiment New
 “ York Volunteers, a prisoner, and
 “ captured the Federal colors of

“that regiment, as well as a number of the enemy.”

Borrowing the words of a correspondent of the *Louisville Courier*, writing from Manassas on the day following the battle, we would say:

“Thus was the day won and the long bright Sabbath closed; a lovely full moon looking down calmly and peacefully upon the bloodiest field that the continent of America ever witnessed;” of course, keeping in mind at the same time the numbers engaged, and the date at which the letter was written.

Much comment has been made as to the failure of the Southern army to continue the pursuit of the enemy to Washington and to take advantage of their general demoralization to effect an entrance into their capital. It will be in place, therefore, to direct attention to the reasons offered by the two Confederate generals commanding on that day. The following is extracted from the official report of Gen. Johnston: “A report came to me from the right that a strong body of United States troops were advancing upon Manassas. Gen. Holmes, who had just reached the field, and Gen. Ewell on his way to it, were ordered to meet this unexpected attack. They found no foe, however. Our victory was as complete as one gained by infantry and artillery can be. An adequate force of cavalry would have made it decisive.”

Gen. Beauregard gives the same explanation, adding that in the return of the forces of Gen. D. R. Jones to this side of Bull Run, which they had crossed to make an attack upon the portion of the Union forces stationed in that vicinity, his men were mistaken, on account of the similarity of their uniforms, for

those of the enemy. He then continues by saying that in addition to the commands of Generals Ewell and Holmes which were ordered to retrace their steps towards Manassas, the pursuing columns were recalled to meet this unexpected new attack. When the error was discovered the night had already set in, and the men were found to be too much exhausted to be capable of a further march before having food and rest. We may observe, therefore, that the failure to advance upon the Northern capital can be reduced to three principal causes: False alarm of an attack on the extreme right, lack of sufficient cavalry, and the extreme exhaustion of the men.

On the other hand, the Northern authorities on the First Battle of Bull Run are by no means willing to concede that in the event that the Southern army had pushed the pursuit further, they would have been successful in dispersing all the forces that could have been opposed to their advance. They maintain with a very good show of reason that if they had remained in the first place a sufficient number of their army which took part in the battle itself, such as Sykes' Battalion of regulars and several regiments which had preserved their organization intact and which could have offered a very respectable resistance to whatever forces the Southerners could have advanced against them; and, further, that the two whole divisions, one between Centerville and the fords leading to Manassas under Col. Miles, and the other between Centerville and Vienna, under Gen. Runyon, both of which took little or no part in the battle, and which were, therefore, in condition to be used to oppose the pursuit of the Confederates.

INTERESTING ADDITIONAL INCIDENTS AND OPINIONS.

The 49th Va. Regiment, commanded by Col. Wm. Smith, which took part in the First Battle of Bull Run, had been brought together only three or four days before the battle, and was composed of three companies. As they had no cartridge-boxes they carried their ammunition in their trousers' pockets.

The following incident, related in the official report of Col. Gorman of the 1st Minn. Regiment, illustrates the coolness and indifference to danger exhibited by Col. Heintzelman during the battle: "On arriving at the point indicated, being the extreme left of the enemy and the extreme right of our line, and in advance of all other of our troops, and where I was informed officially that two other regiments had declined to charge, we formed a line of battle, our right resting within a few feet of the woods and the left at and around Ricketts' battery and upon the crest of the hill, within fifty or sixty feet of the enemy's line of infantry, with whom we could have readily conversed in an ordinary tone of voice. Immediately upon Ricketts' battery coming into position and we in 'line of battle,' Col. Heintzelman rode up between our lines and that of the enemy, within pistol shot of each, which circumstance staggered my judgment whether those in front were friends or enemies, it being equally manifest that the enemy were in the same dilemma as to our identity. But a few seconds, however, undeceived both—they displaying the rebel and we the Union flag. Instantly a blaze of fire was poured into the faces of the combatants, each producing terrible

"destruction, owing to the close proximity of the forces," etc.

One of Stonewall Jackson's staff, in an article contributed to one of the magazines, has rendered equally tribute to the conduct of the same officer. He writes as follows in referring to the attack on Ricketts' and Griffin's batteries: "Three times did our regiment charge up to and take this battery, but never could hold it, for though we drove away the regiment supporting it, yet another was always close behind to take its place. A gray-haired man, sitting sideways on horseback, whom I understood to be General Heintzelman, was ever in one spot, directing the movements of each regiment as it came up the hill, and his coolness and gallantry won our admiration."

Again in the same article, referring to the moment of arrival of his command, he says: "Reaching the top, a wide clearing was discovered; a broad table land spread out, the pine thicket ceased, and far away over the hill in front was the smoke of musketry, at the bottom of a long declivity was the famous turnpike, and on the hills beyond could be seen clearly Griffin's and Ricketts' batteries. In their front, to their rear and supported on each side were long lines of blue. To our right, about one hundred yards off, was a small building, the celebrated 'Henry House.'"

In a letter to the *Richmond Eu-*

quirer, written by one who had visited the battlefield about a week after the occurrence of the first battle, in speaking of the Henry House, he makes the following remarks: "A house here, late the abode of a widow lady—Mrs. Judith Henry—was riddled with musket shot. Hissing projectiles from the cannon of our enemies had passed through the walls and roof until the dwelling was a wreck. It is a sad story that we tell. This estimable lady, who had spent her long life illustrated by the graces that adorn the meek christian, was now bedrid. There she lay amid the horrid din, and no less than three of the missiles of death that scoured through her chamber, inflicted their wounds upon her. It seems a strange dispensation of Providence that one whose life had been so gentle and secluded, should have found her end amid such a storm of human passion," etc.

The following article to the Balto. *Sun* deserves attention for its general accuracy:

"So much has been said and written erroneously concerning the 'killing of a woman' in the old Henry House at the first battle of Manassas, July 21, 1861, as to make a recital of the actual facts in the case of deep interest to both the misinformed and the uninformed, to which end, I trust, you will publish in the far-reaching *Sun* the following true account of that most lamentable occurrence: In the beautiful lawn, distant perhaps not more than fifty feet from the site of the original, historic, old Henry House, which was literally riddled with shot and shell and the lesser missiles as well, in that deadly strife, is now well preserved and handsomely adorned with shrub and vine and the wild ivy blossom, a grave, at the head of which stands erect a

large white marble slab, the lettering of which reads as follows: "The grave of our dear mother, Judith Henry; killed near this spot by the explosion of shells in her dwelling, during the battle of the 21st of July, 1861. When killed she was in her eighty-fifth year, and confined to her bed by the infirmities of age. She was the daughter of Landon Carter, Sr., and was born within a mile of this place. Her husband, Dr. Isaac Henry, was a surgeon in the United States Navy, on board the frigate *Constellation*, commanded by Commodore Truxton. One of the six captains appointed by Washington in the organization of the navy, 1794. Our mother through her long life, thirty-five years of which were spent at this place, was greatly loved and esteemed for her kind, gentle and Christian spirit.' The above inscription gives the correct narrative of the sad death of the estimable old lady, in reading and pondering over which recently, thirty-eight years after my own hair-breadth escape from death in that frightful and never-to-be-forgotten charge of my old Stonewall Brigade within a stone's throw of the agonizing scene of that aged lady's death, I could but reflect how inscrutable, indeed, were the ways of Providence in that dread catastrophe! Her grandson, of less than middle age, who now occupies the present house on the immediate site of the old house, related to me all the particulars. Only a hundred yards or so from the house is still an old depression, or excavation, of the depth of several feet, now used as a watering pond for the cattle, to which Mrs. Henry was borne for safety at the beginning of the battle, but it being found without protection, she was borne back to the old house and placed in bed, where she was shot in four places and almost instantly killed," etc.

In an article in the *Washington Post*, Joaquin Miller says: "This first battle of Bull Run stands first in the alphabet of great American battles. Greater battles have been fought, a greater battle, indeed, on this same ground, but *the first* has fastened itself upon us. There is a savage fascination about it which we who lived on that day cannot escape."

Extract from the testimony of Gen. W. W. Averill before the Congressional Investigating Committee on the Conduct of the War, in which reference is made to the topographical feature of the Henry House hill as a battlefield.

"Question.—Was not the nature of the battlefield such that it was exceedingly difficult to bring a large body of men into action at any one time?"

"Answer.—I think it was about as fine a battlefield as you can find between here and Richmond. I have no idea there was any better.

"Question.—Was the field favorable for the movement and manœuvring of large bodies of men?"

"Answer.—One or two divisions of the size we had then could manœuvre very well."

Among the many references to the Henry House hill in the official reports of Gens. Johnston and Beauregard are the following relating to its appropriateness as a battleground:

Gen. Beauregard says: "From the open ground of this plateau the view embraces a wide expanse of woods and gently undulating open country of broad grass and grain fields in all directions, including the scene of Evans' and Bee's recent encounter with the enemy, some twelve hundred yards to the northward."

Gen. Johnston writes: "Gen. Bee, moving towards the enemy, guided by the firing, had, with a soldier's eye, selected the position near the Henry House, and formed his troops upon it."

In the year 1892 this battlefield was visited by the G. A. R., and after a verification of the historical spots marked on the field, caused tablets to be erected with the following inscriptions:

"Colonel Cameron was killed here, July 21st, 1861."

"Lieutenant Ramsay of Ricketts' Battery was killed here, July 21st, 1861."

"Here Jackson was wounded and got the title of 'Stonewall.'"

"General Bee was killed here, July 21st, 1861."

"Colonel Bartow was killed here, July 21st, 1861."

"Colonel Thomas, of Jos. E. Johnston's staff, was killed here, July 21st, 1861."

"Col. Fisher, of the 6th N. C. Regiment, was killed here, July 21st, 1861."

"Lieutenant Mangum, of the 6th N. C. Regiment, was killed here, July 21st, 1861."

"Location of the Cavalry Charge on Fire Zouaves, July 21st, 1861."

"Wade Hampton was wounded here, July 21st, 1861."

Distant about two hundred yards from the Henry House, in a considerable ravine, is a very large and deep spring, supplied by perennial

^{views}
rains. In the advance of the Northern columns to the Henry House plateau from the scene of the opening encounter, several of the regiments passed by this spring, which was to them an inestimable blessing on that scorching July day. So great, however, was the press of the hundreds of men with parched throats that it was temporarily

emptied. Through the years which have followed the War, not a few of the visitors to the battlefield belonged to those regiments, and their first question is not where such or such command was posted during the battle, but where that spring is, the cool and limpid waters of which were so deeply graven on their minds.

ORGANIZATION OF THAT PART OF GEN. MCDOWELL'S ARMY WHICH TOOK PART IN THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

[The lists which follow are as complete as the records at the disposal of the compiler have permitted.]

1st Division Gen. Dan'l Tyler	1st Brigade— Col. E. D. Keyes	{	1st Conn. Rgt—Lt. Col. Speidal
			2nd " " Col. Terry
			3rd " " Col. Chatfield
			2nd Maine " Col. Jameson
2nd Brigade— Gen. Rob't Seheneck	{	1st Ohio Rgt—Col. McCook	
		2nd " " Lt. Col. Mason	
		2nd N. Y. " Col. Tompkins	
		Carlisle's Battery—six brass guns 1 30-pounder—Lt. Haines	
3rd Brigade— Col. W. T. Sherman	{	13th N. Y. Rgt—Col. Quimby	
		69th " " Col. Coreoran	
		79th " " Col. Cameron	
		2nd Wis. " Lt. Col. Peck Ayres' Battery—six guns	
4th Brigade— Col. Richardson	{	Before Blackburn's Ford	
2nd Division Col. D. Hunter	1st Brigade— Col. Andrew Porter	{	27th N. Y. Rgt—Col. Slocum
			14th " " Col. Wood
			8th " " Col. Lyons
			Battalion of Reg'l'rs, Maj. Sykes " " Marines, " Reynolds Griffin's Battery, six guns
2nd Brigade— Col. A. E. Burnside	{	1st R. I. Rgt—Maj. Baleh	
		2nd " " Col. Slocum	
		71st N. Y. " Col. Martin	
		2nd N. H. " Col. Marston 2nd R. I. Battery—six guns 2 boat howitzers with 71st N. Y. Regiment	

ORGANIZATION OF GEN. MCDOWELL'S ARMY—CONCLUDED.

3rd Division Col. S. P. Heintzelman	{	1st Brigade— Col. W. B. Franklin	{	1st Minn. Rgt—Col Gorman 5th Mass. " _____ 11th " " _____ Ricketts' Battery—six guns
		2nd Brigade Col. O. B. Wilcox	{	1st Mich Rgt— _____ 11th N. Y. " (Fire Zouaves) Col. Farnham 38th N. Y. Rgt Col. Ward Arnold's Battery—4 guns
		3rd Brigade Col. O. O. Howard	{	4th Maine Rgt—Col. Berry 5th " " Col. Dunnell 2nd Vermont Rgt—Col. Whiting

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY UNDER GEN. BEAUREGARD AT THE FIRST
BATTLE OF BULL RUN, WITH POSITION BEFORE
COMMENCEMENT OF BATTLE.

Ewell's Brigade (before Union Mills Ford)	{	5th Ala. Rgt— - - - - Col. Rodes 6th " " - - - - - Col. Siebel 6th La. " - - - - - Col. Seymour 4 12-pounder howitzers of Walton's Battery Harrison's, Green's and Cabell's companies of Va. cavalry
D. R. Jones' Brigade (before McLean's Ford)	{	5th So. Car. Rgt— - - - - Col. Jenkins 17th Miss. " - - - - - Col. Burt 18th " " - - - - - Col. Fetherstone 2 guns from Walton's Battery 1 company of cavalry
Longstreet's Brigade (before Blackburn's Ford)	{	1st Va. Rgt— - - - - Col. Moore 11th " " - - - - - Col. Garland 17th " " - - - - - Col. Corse 24th " " - - - - - Lt. Col. Hairston 5th N. C. " - - - - - Col. Jones 2 guns from Walton's Battery Whitehead's company Va. cavalry
Bonham's Brigade (before Mitchell's Ford)	{	2nd So. Car. Rgt— - - - - Col. Kershaw 3rd " " " - - - - - Lt. Col. Williams 7th " " " - - - - - Col. Bacon 8th " " " - - - - - Col. Cash Shield's and Del. Kemper's Batteries—probably eight guns. Flood's, Radford's, Payne's, Ball's, Wick- ham's and Powell's companies of Va. cavalry, com- manded by Col. Radford
Cocke's Brigade (before the fords between Mitchell's and the Stone Bridge)	{	8th Va. Rgt— - - - - Col. Hunton 18th " " - - - - - Col. Withers 19th " " - - - - - Lt. Col. Strange 28th " " - - - - - Col. R. T. Preston 49th " " - - - - - Col. Wm. Smith Latham's Battery—4 guns 1 company Va. cavalry
Evans' Demi-Brigade (before Stone Bridge and re- porting to Gen. Cocke)	{	4th So. Car. Rgt— - - - - Col. Sloane Battalion La. Tigers - - - - - Maj. Wheat 4 six-pounder guns 2 companies Va. cavalry

ORGANIZATION OF GEN. BEAUREGARD'S ARMY—CONCLUDED.

Early's Brigade (in reserve in rear of Mitchell's, Blackburn's and McLean's Fords)	{	7th Va. Rgt—	-	-	-	-	-	Col. Kemper
		7th La. "	-	-	-	-	-	Col. Hays
		13th Miss. "	-	-	-	-	-	Col. Barksdale
		3 guns of Walton's Battery						
Holmes' Brigade (was called from Aquia Creek to join Gen. Beauregard)	{	2nd Tenn. Rgt—						=====
		1st Ark. "						=====

Hampton's Legion, 600 strong, came up from Richmond shortly before the battle, to join Beauregard's army.

ORGANIZATION OF GEN. JOHNSTON'S ARMY, UNITED WITH THAT OF GEN. BEAUREGARD AT MANASSAS.

Jackson's Brigade	{	2nd Va. Rgt—	-	-	-	-	Col. Allen
		4th " "	-	-	-	-	Col. Jas. F. Preston
		5th " "	-	-	-	-	Col. Harper
		27th " "	-	-	-	-	Lt. Col. Echols
		33rd " "	-	-	-	-	Col. Cummings
Bee's Brigade	{	4th Ala. Rgt—	Col. Jones				} Both brigades commanded by Gen. Bee
		2nd Miss. "	Col. Falkner				
		11th " "	Lt. Col. Liddell (only 2 comp's)				
Bartow's Brigade	{	7th Ga. Rgt—	-	-	-	Col. Gartrell	} Both brigades commanded by Gen. Bee
		8th " "	-	-	-	Lt. Col. Gardner	
		Imboden's Battery—six guns					
Elzey's Brigade	{	10th Va. Rgt—	-	-	-	-	Col. Gibbon
		1st Md. "	-	-	-	-	Lt. Col. Stuart
		3rd Tenn. "	-	-	-	-	Col. Vaughan
Regiments not brigaded	{	8th La. Rgt—	-	-	-	-	Col. Kelley
		6th N. C. "	-	-	-	-	Col. Fisher
		11th " "	-	-	-	-	Col. Kirkland
		13th Va. "	-	-	-	-	Col. A. P. Hill

SECOND BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

As if the grim Spectre of Death had not found upon these hills sufficient victims on that memorable 21st day of July, 1861, Dame Fortune destined that he should have another equally sanguinary feast on the 28th, 29th and 30th of August, 1862, known as the Second Battle of Bull Run. The extent of ground over which this battle stretched was very much more considerable than that of the First Battle of Bull Run. By a curious reversal of roles, it was the Northern troops that this time held the Henry House hill on the 30th, where they made a last stand in an effort to check the ever increasing pressure of the enemy, and to the Southerners was the task to dislodge them. Generals Sykes and Reynolds occupied with their commands the plateau around the Henry House, which in the First Battle

they had assisted as subordinate officers in the effort to drive finally from it the Confederate forces; and it fell to Longstreet in this last battle to capture the position held by the Federals. It was a fierce and desperate struggle. The result is known. To borrow the words of a writer in the *Century Magazine* under date of January, 1886: "Then came the struggle for the Henry House hill, the plateau which was the scene of the hardest fighting in the First Bull Run. It was bristling with the guns of Reynolds' and Reno's, and of Sykes' regulars. The enemy made a vigorous attack. At last darkness, the succor of armies hard pressed, came." It was under cover of the darkness that the Northern troops withdrew from the position.



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